Thyssenkrupp Stock: Adjusted Earnings Up 95 Percent — the Accounts Show a Loss

There is an investor trap that needs no fraud to work — only an asterisk. Call it the asterisk trap: the headline carries the adjusted number, and because it looks friendlier than the real one, that is the number your brain keeps. But "adjusted" means nothing other than: without the parts that hurt. The costs were still incurred, the cash still left the building, and the audited accounts still show the other figure. So let us make a deal: with thyssenkrupp we read both numbers side by side — the one on the front of the package and the one on the ingredients list. The basis is the interim report for the first half of fiscal 2025/2026, published May 12, 2026, and the Annual Report 2024/2025. And out of that comes the tension running through this analysis: almost everything thyssenkrupp reports on an adjusted basis points up — almost everything that stands unadjusted in the accounts points down.

What thyssenkrupp actually does — and why that is hard to say

thyssenkrupp AG, registered in Duisburg and Essen, is not one company but a collection of companies. The group reports in five segments: Automotive Technology (chassis, components, aftermarket and forging for carmakers), Decarbon Technologies (slewing bearings from Rothe Erde, chemical plant engineering from Uhde, cement plants from Polysius and water electrolysis from the separately listed majority holding thyssenkrupp nucera), Materials Services (materials distribution and supply-chain services), Steel Europe (flat steel from Duisburg) and Marine Systems (submarines and naval vessels from TKMS).

Put in everyday terms: picture an apartment building with five wholly unrelated tenants — a steel mill, a car-parts maker, a wholesaler, a plant engineer and a shipyard. All they share is the address and the caretaker. That is exactly the starting point of the group strategy called ACES 2030: thyssenkrupp AG is to become a financial holding company in which the businesses stand on their own, made independent step by step and opened up to third-party investors. This is no longer a statement of intent. The naval unit TKMS AG & Co. KGaA has been separately listed on the Frankfurt Stock Exchange since October 20, 2025 (thyssenkrupp holds 51 percent), the stake in the Hüttenwerke Krupp-Mannesmann steel works went to Salzgitter AG on July 9, 2026, and an extraordinary general meeting on August 7, 2026 votes on spinning off a minority stake in the materials distributor, which has traded under the name tk accelis since July 20, 2026.

At March 31, 2026 the group employed 90,916 people, against 95,560 a year earlier. Revenue in fiscal 2024/2025 came to €32,837 million.

Two things first: no SEC filings — and a shifted fiscal year

Two peculiarities shape every number here. First: thyssenkrupp files no 10-K and no 10-Q. The company is not a U.S. reporting issuer; a search of the registry of the U.S. securities regulator, the SEC, for the tickers TKA and TKAMY returns nothing. Its mandatory reporting runs through the regulated market (Prime Standard) of the Frankfurt Stock Exchange: audited IFRS consolidated accounts, a half-year report and quarterly statements. Every figure here therefore carries the line "Source: fundamental data & company reports (annual/interim report, Frankfurt Stock Exchange)" rather than "SEC filings". You know the same setup from our analysis of Rheinmetall — another German index constituent without SEC registration, where the entire chain of evidence runs through the company's own reports. Because those reports are published in German, the quotes below appear in the original with an English translation.

Second: thyssenkrupp's fiscal year runs from October 1 to September 30. The current fiscal year 2025/2026 ends on September 30, 2026. So when we say "first half of 2025/2026", we mean October 1, 2025 through March 31, 2026 — not January to June. The "second quarter of 2025/2026" is January to March 2026. Comparing thyssenkrupp with a calendar-year company means comparing different stretches of weather.

On timeliness: the latest complete period report is the interim report for the first half of 2025/2026, published May 12, 2026. Everything after that up to our cut-off on August 6, 2026 consists of press releases — the GlobalLogic alliance (June 25, 2026), TKMS being selected for the Canadian submarine program (July 7, 2026), completion of the HKM sale (July 9, 2026) and the tk accelis capital markets day (July 20, 2026). All four appear below. The next set of numbers arrives with the nine-month figures on August 13, 2026.

How this stock landed on our desk

Honestly: not through a screener hit but through a ranking of attention. On our cut-off date of August 6, 2026, thyssenkrupp sat high in the most-discussed rankings on the German retail-investor forum wallstreet-online — the place where German private investors are talking loudest about a stock right now. That is an attention signal and explicitly not a reason to buy. A stock shows up in those lists when a lot is being written about it; that can be enthusiasm, anger, hope or plain habit. With thyssenkrupp there is the added fact that family history and portfolio positions have overlapped here for decades.

For us such a list is useful as a topic radar: when many people talk at once, the details that matter are exactly what gets lost in the noise. We had the same starting point in our analysis of adidas — a completely different company with a strikingly similar question: how much of the recovery is substance, and how much is narrative?

The numbers over the years — fairly credited

First the part that genuinely impresses. thyssenkrupp came out of two disaster years: fiscal 2022/2023 closed with a loss of €1,986 million, fiscal 2023/2024 with a loss of €1,450 million. Earnings per share were minus €3.33 and minus €2.42. In fiscal 2024/2025 the sign flipped: a net profit of €532 million, or €0.75 per share. The market rewarded that with a total shareholder return of 234 percent over the fiscal year; the shares stood at €11.68 on September 30, 2025, after a low of €3.15 on November 1, 2024.

There is operating momentum, too. Adjusted EBIT — the operating result with restructuring, impairments and disposal gains stripped out — rose from €567 million (2023/2024) to €640 million (2024/2025). In the first half of 2025/2026 it climbed 95 percent to €409 million, and in the second quarter alone from €19 million to €198 million. Second-quarter order intake jumped 32 percent to €10,644 million, driven by two additional Type 212CD submarines for Norway. And for an industrial group in this position the balance sheet is remarkably solid: an equity ratio of 36 percent and net financial assets rather than net debt.

Chief executive Miguel López summed up the direction in the half-year press release:

„Die spürbare Ergebnisverbesserung zeigt, dass unser konsequent umgesetztes Performanceprogramm APEX Wirkung entfaltet. Zugleich kommt die Transformation von thyssenkrupp gut voran: Der Verkauf von Automation Engineering ist ein wichtiger Erfolg für die Neuausrichtung von Automotive Technology. Mit dem geplanten Verkauf der HKM-Anteile von thyssenkrupp Steel an Salzgitter vollziehen wir einen wichtigen Schritt, um das Stahlgeschäft wettbewerbsfähig aufzustellen."

Translation: "The tangible improvement in earnings shows that our rigorously implemented APEX performance program is taking effect. At the same time the transformation of thyssenkrupp is progressing well: the sale of Automation Engineering is an important success for the realignment of Automotive Technology. With the planned sale of thyssenkrupp Steel's HKM shares to Salzgitter we are taking an important step towards making the steel business competitive."

— Miguel López, Chief Executive Officer of thyssenkrupp AG, in the press release on the second quarter of 2025/2026, May 12, 2026

So much for the front of the package. Now we turn it around.

What the reports say — the uncomfortable truths

Uncomfortable truth no. 1: €583 million sits between "adjusted" and "reported"

Adjusted EBIT for the first half of 2025/2026 is €409 million. Reported EBIT for the same half-year is minus €174 million, after plus €291 million a year earlier. The difference is not a matter of opinion but of addition, and thyssenkrupp spells it out in the interim report itself:

„Konzernweit war das EBIT im 1. Halbjahr des Geschäftsjahres durch Sondereffekte von insgesamt 583 Mio. € belastet, die mit 472 Mio. € Restrukturierungsaufwendungen insbesondere aus den Segmenten Steel Europe (385 Mio. €) und Decarbon Technologies innerhalb des Zementanlagenbaus (50 Mio. €) enthalten."

Translation: "Across the group, EBIT in the first half of the fiscal year was burdened by special items totalling €583 million, of which €472 million relates to restructuring expenses, in particular from the Steel Europe segment (€385 million) and from Decarbon Technologies within cement plant engineering (€50 million)."

— thyssenkrupp AG, interim report H1 2025/2026, section on special items, page 12

Is that improper? No — the adjustment is properly defined in the annual report, disclosed every quarter and serves the stated purpose of making operating performance comparable across periods. That is a legitimate aim. The problem is that at thyssenkrupp restructuring charges are not a slip but a permanent condition. Special items came to €1,609 million in fiscal 2023/2024, €564 million in fiscal 2024/2025 and already €583 million in the first half of 2025/2026 alone. Remember: when a one-off appears every single year, it is not a one-off — it is a feature of the business.

Uncomfortable truth no. 2: the 2024/2025 profit came from a revaluation, not from the business

The €532 million net profit of fiscal 2024/2025 is the number everyone quoted. Put it next to that year's EBIT — €76 million — and a question arises: how do €76 million of operating profit turn into €532 million of profit after tax? The answer sits in the financial result, which swung by €1,135 million to plus €1,009 million:

„Die Verbesserung betraf mit 902 Mio € hauptsächlich den im Berichtsjahr erfassten Ertrag aus der am 30. September 2025 erfolgten erstmaligen Bewertung der Stammaktien der Elevator-Beteiligung zum beizulegenden Zeitwert, der innerhalb der Finanzierungserträge ausgewiesen wurde."

Translation: "The improvement related mainly, in the amount of €902 million, to the income recognised in the reporting year from the first-time measurement at fair value of the common shares of the Elevator investment on September 30, 2025, which was reported within financing income."

— thyssenkrupp AG, Annual Report 2024/2025, group management report, section on the financial result

In plain terms: since selling its elevator business in 2020, thyssenkrupp has kept a stake in it — indirectly 16.2 percent of TK Elevator. At the balance sheet date that stake was carried at market value for the first time instead of being equity-accounted. The resulting book gain is €902 million. No euro reached a bank account and no tax charge arose. A further €219 million came from the same stake through equity accounting.

And this item is not finished yet. On April 29, 2026 — after the half-year balance sheet date — Finland's Kone and TK Elevator's owners Advent and Cinven agreed on the sale of TK Elevator to Kone. What that means for thyssenkrupp sits in the interim report under "events after the reporting date":

„Auf Basis der aktuellen Beteiligungsverhältnisse und unter Berücksichtigung der Wertverhältnisse der Einigung zwischen Advent/Cinven und Kone würde der beizulegende Zeitwert der Stammaktien um rd. 1 Mrd. € höher sein als der Zeitwert zum 31. März 2026 (1,0 Mrd. €); hieraus erwarten wir kurzfristig einen entsprechenden Effekt auf die Vermögenslage des Konzerns."

Translation: "Based on the current shareholding structure and taking into account the valuation implied by the agreement between Advent/Cinven and Kone, the fair value of the common shares would be around €1 billion higher than the fair value as at March 31, 2026 (€1.0 billion); we expect a corresponding effect on the group's net assets in the short term."

— thyssenkrupp AG, interim report H1 2025/2026, note 16 "Events after the reporting date", page 52

Plainly: the same stake that already produced a €902 million book gain in 2024/2025 is set to be written up by roughly another €1 billion — against a market value of about €7.8 billion for the entire group, that is not a footnote. But it is again not money earned; it is a valuation. Cash only arrives when Kone completes the takeover, and the buyer expects that to take 12 to 18 months and to require clearance from several competition authorities. Remember: a valuation gain lands in equity, not in the bank account.

For you as an investor that means the price-earnings ratio on fiscal 2024/2025 is a pretty number with a weak denominator. Anyone using it is valuing an industrial group on the result of a financial investment. How seriously thyssenkrupp takes that itself shows in its own guidance for the current year: a net loss of €400 million to €800 million.

Uncomfortable truth no. 3: the cash pile lost €2.1 billion in six months

This is the number that decides the fiscal year. Free cash flow before M&A — thyssenkrupp's own metric for cash from the ongoing business, excluding acquisitions and disposals — came to minus €1,827 million in the first half of 2025/2026, against minus €589 million a year earlier. Operating cash flow alone was minus €1,205 million. Cash and cash equivalents fell from €5,725 million to €3,549 million.

„Das Netto-Finanzguthaben ist zum 31. März 2026 im Vergleich zum 30. September 2025 i. W. wegen einer erhöhten Mittelbindung im Netto-Umlaufvermögen von 4,9 Mrd. € auf 2,8 Mrd. € zurückgegangen."

Translation: "Net financial assets fell from €4.9 billion to €2.8 billion as at March 31, 2026 compared with September 30, 2025, essentially because of higher funds tied up in net working capital."

— thyssenkrupp AG, interim report H1 2025/2026, section on free cash flow and net financial assets, page 13

Part of that is explainable. A large customer prepayment for four submarines landed in the prior-year period and was absent this time; inventories and receivables tied up more cash because Materials Services and Steel Europe are carrying more goods. Growth and pre-financing cost money that comes back later — that is the friendly reading.

The unfriendly reading is arithmetic. On May 12, 2026 thyssenkrupp explicitly confirmed its full-year guidance for free cash flow before M&A: minus €600 million to minus €300 million. After six months the figure stands at minus €1,827 million. That means roughly €1.2 billion to €1.5 billion has to come in during the second half — a half in which, according to the same guidance, a further €350 million or so flows out for restructuring. Remember: guidance confirmed at the halfway mark is not a result, it is a promise about the second half. The first verifiable checkpoint is August 13, 2026.

Uncomfortable truth no. 4: what you own changes faster than you can analyse it

The conversion into a financial holding has a side effect that rarely gets discussed: the group whose numbers you are analysing will soon no longer exist in that shape. Three examples from ten months.

TKMS. The spin-off of a 49 percent minority stake in the naval unit was entered in the commercial register on October 17, 2025, and TKMS AG & Co. KGaA was first listed in the Prime Standard on October 20, 2025; the shares joined the MDAX index on December 22, 2025. thyssenkrupp shareholders received one TKMS share for every 20 thyssenkrupp shares. thyssenkrupp remains the majority owner with 51 percent and continues to consolidate the unit in full — the other 49 percent has since appeared in equity as a non-controlling interest. TKMS held an order backlog of more than €20 billion at March 31, 2026, and on July 7, 2026 it was selected as preferred supplier for the Canadian submarine program.

HKM. The Hüttenwerke Krupp-Mannesmann works in Duisburg, in which thyssenkrupp Steel Europe held 50 percent, passed entirely to Salzgitter AG on July 9, 2026 — contracts signed on July 8, closing the next day. The site keeps operating, but the workforce is to shrink from around 3,000 to roughly 1,000 by the end of 2028, and the supply contract with thyssenkrupp Steel ends in 2028, four years earlier than planned.

tk accelis. On July 20, 2026 the materials distributor — until then the Materials Services segment — presented its own medium-term targets at its first capital markets day in London: annual revenue growth above 4 percent and an adjusted EBITDA margin of 4 to 5 percent. The business generated €11.4 billion of revenue in fiscal 2024/2025, with around 15,500 employees, some 400 sites and roughly 250,000 customers. An extraordinary general meeting on August 7, 2026 votes on the spin-off — following the same template as TKMS: 49 percent goes to thyssenkrupp shareholders at a ratio of one tk accelis share for every 20 thyssenkrupp shares, while 51 percent stays inside the group. The listing is planned for 2026. Chief financial officer Daniel Wodera put it like this:

„Unsere Transformation ist real, sie ist messbar, und sie trägt. Unser kapitaleffizientes Modell ist darauf ausgelegt, solide Cashflows über alle Marktphasen und eine nachhaltige Wertschöpfung für unser Unternehmen und unsere Anteilseigner zu ermöglichen."

Translation: "Our transformation is real, it is measurable, and it is delivering. Our capital-efficient model is designed to enable solid cash flows across all market phases and sustainable value creation for our company and our shareholders."

— Daniel Wodera, Chief Financial Officer of tk accelis, in the press release on the capital markets day, July 20, 2026

For an investor this is an unusual mental exercise. You are not buying a company; you are buying a shareholding structure in motion. One illustration: anyone holding thyssenkrupp AG shares today also holds, indirectly, 51 percent of TKMS. That stake was worth around €2.9 billion on August 5, 2026 (63,523,647 TKMS shares at €88.60, of which 51 percent) — against a market value of roughly €7.8 billion for all of thyssenkrupp AG on the same day. A good third of the ticker therefore sits in a subsidiary whose figures you can look up separately. Whether that is hidden value or merely a different presentation of the same substance depends on what is left in the holding company at the end — and on what those leftovers earn.

Uncomfortable truth no. 5: the orders come from a business that will soon be only half in the group

Second-quarter order intake in 2025/2026 rose 32 percent to €10,644 million. That headline has a name: Marine Systems. The segment alone brought in €2,505 million of orders, against €155 million in the prior-year quarter. Over the half-year the picture reverses: group order intake fell 11 percent to €18,323 million, because the large four-submarine order had been booked in the prior-year half (Marine Systems: €5,591 million in the first half of 2024/2025 against €3,409 million in the first half of 2025/2026).

Strip out Marine Systems and what remains of the group in the first half of 2025/2026 is roughly €14.4 billion of revenue on €349 million of adjusted EBIT — a margin of about 2.4 percent. Steel Europe contributed €300 million of adjusted EBIT on €4,453 million of revenue, but booked €385 million of restructuring charges in the same period and therefore swung to minus €104 million of reported EBIT. Automotive Technology managed €60 million of adjusted EBIT on €3,327 million of revenue — a margin of 1.8 percent. Translated: in its two largest industrial businesses the group earns less than €2 per €100 of revenue, and only after adjustment.

Valuation — what the market pays for the remainder

At the Xetra closing price of €12.60 on August 5, 2026, thyssenkrupp AG's 622,531,741 shares carry a market value of roughly €7.8 billion. Against fiscal 2024/2025 revenue of €32,837 million that is a price-to-sales ratio of about 0.24 — one euro of market value for four euros of revenue. That is typical for steel and materials distribution, not for technology.

Earnings are where it gets murky. On earnings per share of €0.75 (fiscal 2024/2025) the price-earnings ratio works out at about 17 — except that this profit, as shown above, rests mainly on a valuation gain. For the current fiscal year thyssenkrupp itself expects a loss of €400 million to €800 million, so no price-earnings ratio can be formed at all. That leaves book value: equity stood at €10,284 million on March 31, 2026, of which €1,126 million was non-controlling interests (essentially the 49 percent of TKMS). That leaves €9,158 million attributable to thyssenkrupp AG shareholders — across 622,531,741 shares, roughly €14.71 per share (as of March 31, 2026). On August 5, 2026 the stock traded at roughly 0.86 times that book value.

Two outside verdicts for context. The rating agencies place thyssenkrupp below investment grade: Standard & Poor's at BB with a stable outlook, Moody's at Ba3 with a stable outlook (as stated in the interim report of May 12, 2026). The analysts: at the end of March 2026, twelve houses published regular recommendations — 42 percent positive, 50 percent neutral, 8 percent negative. That is not a signal of conviction; it is a signal of waiting.

And the price anchors themselves, because they show how volatile this stock is: €3.15 on November 1, 2024; €11.68 at the fiscal year-end on September 30, 2025; an interim high of €12.28 on February 11, 2026; a low of €7.19 on March 30, 2026; and €12.60 on August 5, 2026. Anyone calling this stock cheap or expensive should say which day they mean.

And the balance sheet? That is the best part of this story

For all the criticism, the other side belongs here just as plainly. thyssenkrupp does not have a balance sheet crisis. At March 31, 2026 the accounts showed equity of €10,284 million and an equity ratio of 36 percent, and the group held more financial assets than financial debt: net financial assets of €2,758 million. Available liquidity — cash plus undrawn committed credit lines — stood at €4.6 billion; of a €3.0 billion commercial paper program, just €64 million was drawn. And the risk section of the interim report is unambiguous:

„Aus heutiger Sicht liegen unverändert keine Risiken vor, die den Bestand des Unternehmens gefährden."

Translation: "From today's perspective there are, as before, no risks that endanger the existence of the company."

— thyssenkrupp AG, interim report H1 2025/2026, risk section

That is why, for all the open questions, this is not a case of impaired substance. A company with a 36 percent equity ratio and net financial assets has time — and in a group restructuring, time is the scarcest currency there is.

And artificial intelligence?

thyssenkrupp sells no AI products and reports no AI revenue. The Annual Report 2024/2025 mentions artificial intelligence in the opportunities section with striking caution: opportunities may arise "through the increased use of artificial intelligence (AI), which cannot yet be conclusively assessed today" (translated from the German original), with optimised logistics and production processes given as examples. The press release on the second quarter, dated May 12, 2026, already names a live application: through its Pacemaker unit the materials distributor "launched a new AI-supported application for inventory management, in order to secure product availability in the face of demand swings and to reduce warehousing costs" (translated from the German original). What followed was more concrete. On June 25, 2026 the group announced a strategic alliance with GlobalLogic (Hitachi group) around "physical AI" — autonomous inspection drones and "robocams" in hazardous production areas, plus a data platform linking shop-floor data with business data. And on July 20, 2026 tk accelis named as one of three medium-term priorities that it digitises processes and deploys "AI to raise efficiency" (translated from the German original). In our taxonomy that makes thyssenkrupp an AI user, not an AI vendor: the technology lowers costs and improves safety, but it is not the product.

Opportunities and risks at a glance

Opportunities

• Adjusted EBIT rose 95 percent to €409 million in the first half of 2025/2026, with every segment except Decarbon Technologies and Marine Systems lifting its contribution. Steel Europe swung from minus €23 million to plus €84 million in the second quarter.
• The balance sheet holds: a 36 percent equity ratio, €2,758 million of net financial assets and €4.6 billion of available liquidity at March 31, 2026.
• The restructuring produces verifiable results rather than announcements: TKMS separately listed since October 20, 2025, HKM sold on July 9, 2026, Automation Engineering on March 31, 2026, and tk accelis up for a vote on August 7, 2026.
• The stock trades below book value (about 0.86 times on August 5, 2026) and at a price-to-sales ratio of roughly 0.24 — anyone who believes the restructuring will succeed is paying no premium for the substance.
• Marine Systems provides a tailwind from the European defense cycle: an order backlog above €20 billion at March 31, 2026 and selection as preferred supplier for the Canadian submarine program on July 7, 2026.
• The remaining 16.2 percent of TK Elevator is set to be written up by around €1 billion following the Kone agreement of April 29, 2026 (fair value at March 31, 2026: €1.0 billion) — although cash only follows on completion, which the buyer expects in 12 to 18 months.

Risks

• Free cash flow before M&A stood at minus €1,827 million after six months. Reaching the company's own full-year guidance of minus €600 million to minus €300 million requires roughly €1.2 billion to €1.5 billion in the second half.
• thyssenkrupp itself expects a net loss of €400 million to €800 million for fiscal 2025/2026 and a return on capital employed between minus 4 percent and zero — the group is not earning its cost of capital.
• Restructuring charges are a permanent condition: €1,609 million of special items in fiscal 2023/2024, €564 million in 2024/2025 and €583 million in the first half of 2025/2026 alone.
• The ratings of BB (Standard & Poor's) and Ba3 (Moody's) sit below investment grade — debt is expensive for this group.
• The perimeter keeps changing. Every spin-off shrinks what remains in the holding company, comparability of the group's own time series suffers, and the proceeds of a spin-off go to shareholders as shares rather than to the group as cash.
• Steel Europe depends on steel prices, energy costs and trade policy — three variables thyssenkrupp does not control. Construction of the direct reduction plant in Duisburg continues despite what the company calls regulatory uncertainty.

A human conclusion

The asterisk trap from the opening is not a quirk of thyssenkrupp's press office; it is the nature of this stock. Both numbers are true. Adjusted EBIT of €409 million shows what the group earns day to day if you set the restructuring aside. Reported EBIT of minus €174 million shows what is left if you do not. And free cash flow of minus €1,827 million shows what happened in the bank account — the one number that cannot be adjusted.

What you make of that hangs on a single question: do you believe the restructuring will ever be finished? If yes, the special items really are a transition, and in a few years the adjusted figure will sit next to the real one. If no, you are buying a company that has been reporting the same exception for years. The balance sheet gives thyssenkrupp time to answer that question — but time is not a result. The next piece of evidence lands on August 13, 2026 with the nine-month figures, and then on December 8, 2026 with the annual report.

We are not telling you whether to buy. We are telling you this: read both numbers, not one. What you make of it is your decision. And that is exactly how it should be.

Sources

• thyssenkrupp AG, interim report for the first half of fiscal 2025/2026 (October 1, 2025 to March 31, 2026), published May 12, 2026 — latest period report
• thyssenkrupp AG, press release on the second quarter of 2025/2026, May 12, 2026
• thyssenkrupp AG, Annual Report 2024/2025 (fiscal year ended September 30, 2025)
• thyssenkrupp AG, press release on the first quarter of 2025/2026, February 12, 2026
• thyssenkrupp AG, press release on the GlobalLogic alliance ("physical AI"), June 25, 2026
• thyssenkrupp AG, press release "Salzgitter AG takes over HKM in full", July 9, 2026
• thyssenkrupp AG, press release on the tk accelis capital markets day, July 20, 2026
• thyssenkrupp AG, financial calendar (nine-month report 2025/2026 on August 13, 2026; annual report 2025/2026 on December 8, 2026)
• Price and valuation data: fundamental data, Xetra closing prices of August 5, 2026 (thyssenkrupp €12.60, TKMS €88.60).
• Ranking of the most-discussed stocks on the wallstreet-online forum, cut-off date August 6, 2026 (the starting point for this analysis, not a source for company figures).

Transparency & disclaimer: this article is journalistic analysis of publicly available information. It is not investment advice, not a recommendation to buy or sell, and not a solicitation to buy or sell securities. Equity investments carry substantial risk up to total loss. All figures carry the reporting date stated in the text; the overall cut-off for this version is August 6, 2026. The latest period report evaluated is the interim report for the first half of fiscal 2025/2026, published May 12, 2026; the nine-month figures on August 13, 2026 may update or correct the numbers shown here. The author holds no position in thyssenkrupp shares at the time of publication.